The Economist carries an about a global contest which is under way to recruit like-minded countries as supporters, reprints the article.

Most countries have no desire to choose between China and America. But it is becoming clear that they might have to. The contest between the two powers is going global. This is an age of political turmoil, economic angst and rising barriers to trade. In Beijing and Washington leaders see opportunities to blame rivals in the other capital for making the chaos worse.

For now, this contest often sounds surprisingly high-minded. Because so many countries fear a conflict between China and America, the two giants have cause to play the responsible, constructive great power. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, duly adopted a gracious tone when he hosted America’s secretary of state, Antony Blinken, in Beijing on April 26th. Earlier China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, had accused the Biden administration of trying to contain his country with “endless measures to suppress China’s economy, trade, as well as science and technology”. But Mr Xi wished to talk about the “bigger picture”, namely that “the world today is undergoing transformation not seen in a century”, and that “we live in an interdependent world and rise and fall together.” He suggested that China and America should help one another and avoid “vicious competition”. Amid the warm words, Mr Xi offered a rebuke, noting that China opposes alliances and American-led “small blocs”. That is code that China uses when accusing America of endangering peace by maintaining defence alliances with Atlantic partners in nato, and with its Indo-Pacific partners, Japan, the Philippines and South Korea.

Warm words should fool nobody. China’s hostility to American-led alliances and blocs is an argument about power. It is also a challenge to the legitimacy of America’s presence as a security guarantor in Europe and Asia. On May 5th Mr Xi will leave for a five-day visit to three European countries, France, Hungary and Serbia. His itinerary is no accident. Each of those countries is praised by Chinese diplomats for its commitment to “strategic autonomy” and an independent foreign policy, meaning a willingness to defy America.

Previewing Mr Xi’s visit, Lu Shaye, China’s ambassador to France, reminded Chinese reporters in Paris of the moment, 60 years ago, when France’s then president, Charles de Gaulle, had the courage to withstand “heavy pressure from the Western camp” (ie, America) to establish diplomatic relations with China.

In Beijing the embassies of other European Union countries grumble that efforts to reach a consensus on China policies are routinely blocked by one member—Hungary. That diplomatic stance is directed from the top by Viktor Orban, the Hungarian prime minister and an avowedly pro-Chinese, pro-Russian champion of “illiberal nationalism”.

Mr Xi’s stop in Serbia is timed to coincide, to the day, with the 25th anniversary of nato’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in the Serbian capital, Belgrade. Three Chinese journalists died in that bombing and China has never accepted America’s insistence that the attack was an error. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Chinese officials blamed nato for provoking Russia by expanding to take in former Soviet-bloc countries. Nearer to home, China pushes the same line that America is an unwelcome, troublemaking presence when it sails warships through the South China Sea, in international waters that China claims for its own.

Still, as this contest for influence gathers pace, America has its own arguments to make about China isolating itself. In his meetings in Beijing Mr Blinken suggested that China is imperilling its own interests in three ways. The first involves Chinese harassment of coastguard ships and fishing boats belonging to the Philippines, an American treaty ally, as China asserts claims to almost the entire South China Sea, in defiance of international law. Mr Blinken pointed to a dramatic strengthening by the Philippines of its ties with America, and to unprecedented displays of support from such regional allies as Japan, South Korea and Australia.

Second, Mr Blinken told his Chinese hosts that European security has for many decades been a “core interest” for America—a deliberate use of a phrase often uttered by Chinese diplomats. Europe’s security is threatened by Chinese companies selling large quantities of microelectronics, machine tools and other dual-use components that Russia needs to make weapons for its war against Ukraine, Mr Blinken told his hosts. China needs to choose between propping up Russia and its desire for close relations with Europe, the secretary of state argued, citing views expressed to him by multiple European leaders.

As Nicholas Burns, the American ambassador to China, puts it: “The government in Beijing needs to understand that Putin’s aggression on Ukraine is an existential threat to Europe. That is why the Europeans have been so angry with Chinese companies selling dual-use items to the Russian defence industry.”

Even superpowers need friends

Finally, Mr Blinken said that many countries share American concerns about Chinese industrial overcapacity leading to goods being exported at artificially low prices. He cited eu investigations into solar panels and electric vehicles from China, and Mexican and Brazilian probes into alleged dumping by Chinese firms.

Source: caliber.az